The law affords injured individuals the right to pursue claims against the person or entity that caused their harm, in a jurisdiction of their choosing. While in many cases a plaintiff’s jurisdictional choice will remain undisturbed, a plaintiff does not have an absolute right to dictate where an action will be heard. Rather, in cases where the defendant argues that jurisdiction is improper, the plaintiff must establish that the court can validly exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Recently that United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts analyzed whether jurisdiction over an out of state defendant was proper under the Massachusetts long-arm statute, in a case in which the defendant was an out of state corporation. If you were injured by a company that is based in another state, you should consult a seasoned Massachusetts personal injury attorney to discuss the appropriate manner in which to pursue damages for your harm.
Facts of the Accident
It is alleged that the plaintiff, who is a resident of Massachusetts, was vacationing in Florida, at a resort owned by the defendant, when she was injured in a scooter accident. The defendant does not own or lease any property in Massachusetts or have any offices or employees in Massachusetts and is not registered as a foreign corporation in Massachusetts. The plaintiff then filed a lawsuit against the defendant in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint, arguing the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The court granted the defendant’s motion, and the plaintiff appealed.
Massachusetts Long-Arm Statute
The Massachusetts long-arm statute, Mass. Gen. L. c. 223A, § 3, permits a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a person or company who directly or indirectly conducts business in Massachusetts if the alleged cause of action arises out of the business conducted in Massachusetts. The first prong of the long-arm statute can be met by showing the defendant engaged in the purposeful solicitation of business from the residents of Massachusetts, while the second prong requires a plaintiff to show that “but for” such solicitation, she or he would not have suffered harm.
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